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Summary
The Federal Technology Transfer Act of 1986 offers private industry
the opportunity to enter into cooperative research and development agree-
ments with scientists in federal laboratories and to gain rights in intel-
lectual property resulting from such collaborations. Increased collabo-
ration with private industry, however, expands the potential for conflicts
of interest. Resolution of the tensions between the Technology Transfer
Act and federal conflict of interest rules is important because federal
laboratories, such as the NIH, are experiencing a loss of senior scientists
to universities and private industry due to inadequate compensation.
These tensions may be resolved by some combination of policies, regu-
lations, and legislation aimed at permitting government scientists to hold
certain carefully defined financial interests in inventions resulting from
industry collaboration, and to pursue simultaneously other outside ac-
tivities, such as consulting for different companies.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Substantial economic rewards may await companies in the biotech-
nology industry willing to invest in certain public-private partnerships
in research offered by the federal government. Pursuant to legislation
enacted during the 1980's - most particularly the Federal Technology
Transfer Act of 19861 - private companies that develop biomedical or
other biotechnological products and processes may participate in coop-
erative research with federally-funded laboratories and obtain an
assignment of patents or licenses in resulting inventions.
In 1988 and 1989, certain laboratories at the National Institute of
Health ("NIH") entered into the first wave of the Cooperative Research
and Development Agreements ("CRADAs") authorized by this legisla-
tion.2 As explained more fully below, a CRADA is a contract under which,
typically, a company contributes money and expertise to a federal labo-
ratory to augment its ongoing research, in exchange for rights in any
resulting inventions. Because of the depth and breadth of research con-
stantly in process at NIH, companies willing to invest in such agreements
now have the rare opportunity to gain rights in patentable inventions in
the areas of AIDS, cancer, and genetic engineering, to name only a few.
While a CRADA relationship offers the potential for significant rewards
to both government and industry, the recent experiences of several
biomedical companies with the NIH suggest that establishing such re-
lationships may entangle companies and scientists in an expanded web
of potential conflicts of interest. As government employees, NIH scientists
find themselves significantly underpaid in comparison to their colleagues
who work in private industry and academia.3 Currently, many NIH sci-
entists choose to supplement their incomes by consulting for private in-
dustry. Yet, the network of laws covering conflicts of interest by federal
employees may force the government scientist to choose between con-
sulting and establishing a CRADA, not only with the same company, but
with companies that are only distantly related through common investors.
Pub. L. No. 99-502, 99th Cong., 2d Sess., 100 Stat. 1785 (1986).
2 See Booth, NIH Scientists Agonize Over Technology Transfer, 243 Sci. 20
(1989). The Booth article reported that about fifty NIH CRADAs had been signed
as of January 6, 1989. Id. A recent GAO study indicates that the precise number
was 48 as of February, 1989. General Accounting Office, Technology Transfer:
Implementation Status of the Federal Technology Transfer Act of 1986 (May 1989).
Other agencies that have executed significant numbers of CRADAs include the
Department of Agriculture's Agricultural Research Service which has executed
59, National Institute of Standards and Technology which has executed 37, and
the Department of the Army which has executed 12. Id.
3 See Fauci, Testimony Before The [Federal] Commission on Executive, Leg-
islative and Judicial Salaries (Nov. 10, 1988). According to Dr. Fauci, Director of
the National Institute of Allergy and Infectious Diseases, the average compen-
sation paid to Senior Executive Service physicians is half the average supple-
mented compensation paid to the chairs of clinical science departments of
American medical schools let alone to their counterparts in private industry.
Specific examples of recruiting difficulties encountered by NIH are cited in Dr.
Fauci's testimony. Id.
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Resolving these conflict of interest issues is especially important in the
current environment. If the NIH is to maintain its traditional leadership
role in scientific research to compete with more attractive job offers from
industry and academia, new compensatory mechanisms may be necessary.
At the same time, however, the Health and Human Services Office of
Inspector General has announced plans to review current NIH policies
to determine whether they are sufficient to prevent financial gain by NIH
researchers from improperly approving drugs in clinical trials.4 In ad-
dition, only intense objections from industry and academia recently led
NIH to withdraw severe proposed conflicts guidelines that would have
prohibited researchers who receive federal grants from holding an inter-
est in any company "that would be affected by the outcome of the re-
search."5 Measures such as these have the potential to chill any interest
in cooperative research out of fear of violating conflict of interest laws or
guidelines. Accordingly, it is essential to develop new regulations or stat-
utes which deal with the conflict situations that inevitably will arise
under the Technology Transfer Act.
This article takes the position that the public-private partnerships en-
visioned by the Technology Transfer Act represent a congressional choice
to permit federal agencies broader latitude in the involvement and com-
pensation of government scientists with private industry than has so far
been recognized. This article summarizes current federal law governing
the commercialization of federally-funded technology, and offers sugges-
tions for remedying some of the more prominent inconsistences with the
conflict of interest laws. While the article focuses on cooperative research
efforts between private industry and NIH laboratories with which the
author has had some personal experience, the principles discussed will
apply to similar cooperation with other federally-funded laboratories.
Part I of the article details the history and provisions of the Technology
Transfer Act and the NIH guidelines currently governing CRADAs. Part
II discusses the sometimes contradictory provisions of law on conflicts of
interest by federal employees. Assessing these various provisions, this
Part argues that the described history of the technology transfer legis-
lation evidences congressional intent to permit government scientists a
degree of financial involvement in private companies, through CRADAs,
that would be otherwise unlawful. Part III concludes the article with a
discussion of several options that federal agencies such as the NIH, or
Congress, might follow to achieve the goals of technology transfer, without
undermining the letter or spirit of the conflict of interest laws.
33 The Blue Sheet 3 (Jan. 10, 1990).
1 See Washington Post, Dec. 30, 1989, at B1, col. 1; NIH GUIDE FOR GRANTS &
CONTRACTS, VOL. 18 (Sept. 15, 1989).
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II. FEDERAL TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER ACT OF 1986
A. Historical Background of Technology Transfer Legislation
In the 1970s, prominent scientists joined with groups of innovative
investors to create the first for-profit biotechnology research companies.
Such companies were founded on the idea that many products and proc-
esses theretofore languishing in the laboratories of scientists might have
commercial applications. The most public, but by no means the only such
effort, was in the area of recombinant DNA research.6 In an effort to make
commercial use of such research, the companies sought agreements with
major universities to share resources, personnel, and technology.
The academic community initially scrutinized such offers with under-
standable wariness. In accepting the funds and resources of private in-
dustry, would universities sacrifice their independence? Would they lose
their freedom to pursue avenues of research that are not likely to lead
to commercial inventions? Would they become, in effect, mere colonies of
the for-profit sector?
The experience of the universities has demonstrated that these concerns
were unfounded. Studies have reported that university research faculty
who receive a large proportion of their research support from industry,
or combine such support with other types of industrial relationships, have
significantly more publications and involvement in other professional
activities. 7 In addition, the majority of academic scientists operating both
with and without significant industry support expressed concern that such
support had the potential for shifting too much emphasis to applied re-
search." As one study pointed out, this finding provides evidence that:
at least at current levels of involvement with industry, faculty
remain sensitive to traditional university values and practices.
Although not a guarantee against erosion of these values, such
faculty attitudes may indicate that they retain a capacity to
police their own relationship with industrial sponsors. 9
The "traditional university values" of NIH scientists should be even more
likely to resist erosion because government will always contribute a
larger percentage of the total research budget of federal laboratories such
as the NIH than will private industry.
In 1980, Congress took its first step to implement a similar program
for commercialization of federally-funded technology. The Stevenson-
'See Blumenthal, University-Industry Research Relationships in
Biotechnology: Implications for the University, 231 Sci. 1361 (1986).
'Id. at 1365; see also Blumenthal, Commercializing University Research, 314
NEW ENG. J. MED. 1621, 1625 (1986); see also Blumenthal, Industrial Support of
University Research in Biotechnology, 231 Sci. 242 (1986).
See id. at 1365.
9 Id.
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Wydler Technology Innovation Act of 198010 sought to "improve the eco-
nomic, environmental, and social well-being of the United States" by,
among other things, "stimulating improved utilization of federally funded
technology developments by State and local governments and the private
sector."" The Act sought to accomplish this goal by requiring each federal
laboratory to establish an Office of Research and Technology Applications
to identify and assess each project having potential for successful appli-
cation in state or local government or private industry. 2 The Act also
created a Center for the Utilization of Federal Technology within the
Department of Commerce to serve as a clearinghouse for information on
federally-owned or originated technologies having potential commercial
application.'8
Stevenson-Wydler's policy of promoting the transfer of federal tech-
nology to private industry, state and local governments received a sig-
nificant boost from amendments to the United States patent laws passed
during the same congressional session. Prior to 1980, U.S. companies
desiring to use government-funded research to develop new products and
processes had to confront what the House committee report described as
"a bewildering array of twenty six different sets of agency regulations
governing their rights to use such research."'4 At that time, the general
rule was that rights to inventions developed with federal funds belonging
to the federal government. With the Bayh-Dole Patent and Trademark
Amendments of 1980 (the "Bayh-Dole Amendments"), Congress amended
the patent statute to provide that ownership of patent rights, in sub-
stantially all inventions developed in the laboratories of small businesses
and nonprofit organizations 5 through government-funded research,
would belong to the private contractor. 6
10 Stevenson-Wydler Technology Innovation Act, Pub. L. No. 96-480, 94 Stat.
2311 (1980) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 3701 et seq.) (1982).
11 Pub. L. No. 96-480, § 3 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 3702(3)) (1982).
12 Pub. L. No. 96-480, § 11 (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 3710(b) & (c)) (1982).
13 Pub. L. No. 96-480, § 11 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 3710(d)) (1982). The De-
partment of Commerce has placed this center in the National Technical Infor-
mation Service ("NTIS"). See S.Rep. No. 283, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 3, reprinted in
1986 U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. News 3442, 3444.
14 H.R. Rep. No. 1307, Part I, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 2, reprinted in 1980 U.S.
Code Cong. & Admin. News 6460, 6461 (1980).
5 The Bayh-Dole Amendments define "nonprofit organizations" as "universi-
ties or other institutions of higher education," § 501(c)(3) tax exempt organiza-
tions, or "any nonprofit scientific or educational organization qualified under a
state nonprofit organization statute." 35 U.S.C. § 201(i) (1984). "Small business
firm" means a firm independently owned and operated and not dominant in its
field, as defined in the Small Business Act, 15 U.S.C. § 632. 35 U.S.C. § 201(h)
(1984).
16 Bayh-Dole Amendments, Pub. L. No. 96-517, § 6(A) (1980) (codified at 35
U.S.C. §§ 201 (a) - (i)) (1982). Regulations implementing this legislation were
promulgated on March 18, 1987 (ownership), and on March 12, 1985 (licensing).
37 C.F.R. §§ 401.1 et seq., 404.1 et seq. The original House bill also proposed a
uniform patent policy that would have permitted contractors which did not qualify
as small businesses or non-profit organizations to obtain an exclusive license to(rather than ownership of) technology developed, but these provisions were de-
leted in the Senate amendments. See H.R. Rep. No. 1307, Part I, 96th Cong., 2d
Sess. 11-22 126 Cong. Rec. 30,560 (1980) (remarks of Rep. Fuqua).
1989-90]
JOURNAL OF LAW AND HEALTH
Together, these two pieces of legislation represented a major shift in
congressional policy toward the permissible uses of technology conceived
or first reduced to practice with federal funds. Under Stevenson-Wydler,
the federal government adopted at least a general policy supporting the
transfer, where appropriate, of federal technology to private industry and
state and local governments which could be anticipated to use it in ad-
vancing technological innovation. Under the Bayh-Dole Amendments,
this policy began to take shape, as certain elements of the private sector
- small businesses and nonprofit organizations - received an extra
incentive to apply for government grants or contracts, or otherwise to
invest in research also funded in part by the federal government. The
incentive, of course, was the possibility of obtaining patent rights to
marketable products or processes developed in the course of such research.
Despite these first steps, in the early 1980s the mechanisms for tech-
nology transfer from federal laboratories remained uncertain. Most fed-
eral laboratories lacked clear authority to enter into cooperative research
projects with private industry.1 7 In addition, even where federal labora-
tories were willing to enter into such agreements, neither statute nor
regulation defined the rights of the private collaborators in any resulting
inventions.18 Recognizing that more work needed to be done, both exec-
utive and legislative branches began more vigorously to study ways to
improve technology innovation, transfer, and commercialization. In 1983,
the White House Science Council Federal Laboratory Review Panel called
for greater technology transfer between federal laboratories and the pri-
vate sector.19 The Panel suggested that the federal government foster
strong interactions between its laboratories and industry and users of
research in order to "maximize the complementary use of talent and
resources... [and] to assure the application of results to broader, practical
uses."20 Consequently, the Panel formally recommended that research and
development interactions between federal laboratories and industry be
greatly increased by more exchange of knowledge and personnel on col-
laborative projects. 21
17 See S. Rep. No. 283, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 3-4, reprinted in 1986 U.S. Code
Cong. & Admin. News 3444-3445.
8 The Bayh-Dole Amendments apply only to work performed under a "funding
agreement." The patent statute defines such an agreement as "any contract, grant,
or cooperative agreement entered into between any federal agency ... and any
contractor for the performance of experimental, developmental, or research work
funded in whole or in part by the Federal Government." 35 U.S.C. § 201(b)(1984).
This language has never been thought to apply to work performed in a laboratory
owned and operated by the federal government, such as the laboratories at the
NIH. If that were the case, any private company collaborating with an NIH
laboratory under a CRADA would automatically be entitled to ownership of any
inventions. Given the ownership and licensing options presented in the Tech-
nology Transfer Act, it is highly unlikely that Congress intended such a result.
11 See generally Off. of Sci. and Tech. Pol., Report of the White House Science
Council Federal Laboratory Review Panel (May 1, 1983).
21 Id. at 3.
21 Id. at 12.
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B. Statutory Provisions
Congress responded to the recommendations of the Panel with the Fed-
eral Technology Transfer Act of 1986, which has as its purpose the en-
couragement of technology transfer between government scientists and
private industry.2 2 The Act is intended to provide federal laboratories
with clear authority to enter into cooperative research and development
agreements with a wide range of parties, including small "start-up" com-
panies.
23
Recognizing that technology exists in our federal laboratories that is
not readily available to private industry, the Act encourages the exchange
of commercially valuable information between the public and private
sectors by permitting the director of any government-operated federal
laboratory to enter into CRADAs with industrial organizations and to
negotiate licensing agreements. 24 As defined in the Act, a CRADA is a
contract in which the federal laboratory and the collaborator agree to
share personnel, services, facilities, equipment or other resources toward
the conduct of specified research or development efforts consistent with
the mission of the laboratory.25 In addition, the non-federal collaborating
party may, and usually does, contribute funds to the federal laboratory.
Under a CRADA, a federal laboratory may grant to a collaborating
party patent licenses (or assignments or options) in any invention made
in whole or in part by a federal employee under the CRADA, subject only
to a nonexclusive license retained by the government. 26 The lab may also
waive any federal ownership rights (again subject to retaining a nonex-
clusive license), and may permit employees or former employees to par-
ticipate in efforts to commercialize inventions they made while
employees.2
7
Of particular significance, the Technology Transfer Act also requires
that agencies operating large laboratories 28 establish a program of cash
awards for employees responsible for commercially valuable inventions
and for exemplary activities that result in utilization of science and tech-
nology by American industry or business.29 In addition, royalties received
by a federal agency for inventions developed under a CRADA or licensed
22 Pub. L. No. 99-502, 99th Cong., 2d Sess., 100 Stat. 1785 (1986) (amending
15 U.S.C. §§ 3701 et seq.).
See H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 953, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 5, reprinted in 1986 U.S.
Code Cong. & Admin. News 3457.
15 U.S.C. § 3710a(a).
15 U.S.C. § 3710a(d).
Id. at § 3710a(b)(2).
Id. at § 3710a(b)(3), (4). In selecting collaborating parties, the lab must give
"special consideration" to small business firms and consortia involving small
businesses and give "preference" to business units located in the United States
which agree that products developed will be manufactured substantially in the
United States. Id. at § 3710a(c)(4).
This provision applies to each federal agency that is making expenditures
at a rate of more than $50,000,000 per fiscal year for research and development
in its government-operated laboratories. 15 U.S.C. § 3710b.
29 15 U.S.C. § 3710b.
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by the agency under the patent laws must be shared at a rate of at least
fifteen percent with the employee-inventor.
3 0
These provisions of the Technology Transfer Act demonstrate the gov-
ernment's substantial commitment to commercializing technology de-
veloped in federal laboratories. More specifically, the latter provisions
make plain that Congress affirmatively desired to give federal employees
financial incentives to participate in the process: cash awards for en-
couraging the transfer of technology from federal labs to private industry,
and a financial interest in their inventions whenever those inventions
are commercialized under a CRADA or otherwise licensed by private
industry.
C. Implementation
The Technology Transfer Act specifically authorizes each federal agency
to issue its own regulations regarding implementation of the statute's
provisions.31 To date, no agency has promulgated published regulations;
however, several agencies, including the NIH, have adopted guidelines
for implementing the statute. At the NIH, these guidelines (and the
technology transfer program) are the responsibility of the Office of Tech-
nology Transfer ("OTT"), formerly the Office of Invention Development
("OID").
Under a typical NIH CRADA, a government scientist collaborates on
a specified research project with a company scientist (the "investigators").
The company might also fund one or more research fellows to work with
the government's principal investigator on the research project. The com-
pany may also contribute other resources, such as additional research
scientists, supplies or operating expenses. In exchange for this support
and participation, the company obtains rights - typically an exclusive
license or an option to an exclusive license - in any invention produced
under the collaboration.
Initially, the first NIH CRADAs often were drafted by counsel for the
proposed collaborator, and then revised by the parties in negotiation. In
April 1989, OTT (then OID) adopted for use by the NIH and the Alcohol,
Drug Abuse and Mental Health Administration ("ADAMHA") a model
CRADA which, while still subject to negotiation, set forth the basic
legal framework for the collaboration. The role of the collaborating in-
vestigators is to draft a research plan which defines the scope of the
collaboration. This is an important step because the description of the
scope of the collaboration could be regarded as limiting the scope of in-
ventions as to which the private collaborator is entitled to licensing rights.
A clear description also facilitates management oversight at NIH and at
the collaborating company.
30 15 U.S.C. § 3710c.
31 Id. at § 3710a(c).
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Once the CRADA and research plan have been reduced to writing, the
NIH investigator must complete a CRADA Clearance Form and submit
it with the proposed agreement to his or her laboratory chief. At the NIH,
the CRADA must first be approved by both the lab chief and the Scientific
Director of the lab's research institute.3 2 The CRADA next must be cleared
by the OTT and the NIH legal counsel. 33
Approval by the OTT, the NIH legal counsel, the lab chief, and the
Scientific Director is all that is required if the CRADA does not address
the possibility of an exclusive license. Virtually all CRADAs contemplate
exclusive licensing and, therefore, must also be forwarded to the CRADA
Subcommittee of the NIH/ADAMHA Patient Policy Board for review.
Currently, the CRADA Subcommittee is appointed by the Chairman of
the Patent Policy Board and consists of senior scientists and administra-
tors (of different NIHIADAMHA institutes and from the Director's office),
as well as legal counsel. Following CRADA subcommittee review, the
Chairman of the Patent Policy Board gives approval on behalf of the NIH
Director. The CRADA may be signed by the institute director and re-
turned to the collaborator for its signature once any required changes
have been made. The CRADA Subcommittee must transmit a written
explanation of changes or disapproval to the director of the laboratory
concerned.3
4
III. LIMITATIONS ON TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER:
FEDERAL CONFLICT OF INTEREST LAWS
The described provisions of the Technology Transfer Act, while clear
enough on their face, nevertheless present interesting problems in stat-
utory construction. Although legislative history suggests that Congress
did not intend the Act to change existing conflict- of interest laws,5 ex-
perience with those laws reveals an indisputable conflict with the Tech-
nology Transfer Act.
32 The NIH currently has sixteen such institutes, centers, or divisions, such as
the National Cancer Institute and the National Center for Human Genetic
Research.
Legal counsel to NIH is provided through Attorney Advisors assigned by the
Office of General Counsel of the Department of Health and Human Services. This
office has developed its own list of provisions that a CRADA should contain,
including the specific contributions of each party, rights upon termination, and
a specific disputes resolution clause.
15 U.S.C. § 3710a(c)(5). Under the terms of the Technology Transfer Act,
any disapproval or modification by the Agency director (or his or her designee)
must be accomplished within 30 days. Id. The NIH treats this 30-day period as
beginning with the date of CRADA Subcommittee approval.
M U. S. Rep. No. 283, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 10, reprinted in 1986 U.S. Code
Cong. & Admin. News 3452 (Technology Transfer Act "make[s] no changes in
the conflict of interesting laws affecting federal employees or former federal em-
ployees"). The passage goes on to discuss former employees, suggesting that Con-
gress's focus was on those conflict of interest laws that preclude lobbying or
otherwise representing a party before any agency with respect to any matter on
which the employee worked while at NIH. See 18 U.S.C. § 207; 45 C.F.R. § 73.735-
1401.
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The activities of employees of the NIH are regulated by statutes which
are applicable to all federal employees, regulations which are applicable
to all HHS personnel, and internal guidelines that are issued by the NIH
itself. The provisions impose both civil and criminal penalties on "public
officials" who violate them.36 The NIH Manual3 7 also "states the policies
and guidelines which govern outside work and activities requiring ap-
proval above the level of the BID Director."38 These provisions are in-
applicable to work performed pursuant to a CRADA because such work
is, by definition, part of the employee's "official duties" and hence, not
"outside work."39 However, as discussed later, the Manual is applicable
to scientists who consult for private industry and, therefore, may have
an impact on such a scientist's freedom to enter into a CRADA. The
discussion below summarizes these provisions and the limitations they
place on NIH scientists engaged in CRADAs with private industry.
A. Criminal Statutes
Chapter 11 of Title 18 of the U.S. Code makes felonies of Bribery, Graft,
and Conflicts of Interest. While the provisions of this chapter defining
traditional bribery offenses are unlikely to be a source of concern to
scientists or industry,40 other more general conflict of interest provisions
do raise such concerns.
One criminal statute presents some danger of liability primarily in
connection with the CRADA approval process. Under this provision, it is
unlawful to give or receive any compensation for services rendered or to
be rendered by an officer or employee of the United States in relation to
any matter in which the United States has a direct and substantial in-
terest.41 This provision would prohibit an NIH scientist from receiving
anything of value for serving as a consultant or otherwise lobbying on
behalf of a particular applicant for a CRADA. The penalty is an unspec-
ified fine and/or up to two years in prison.
3 The statute defines "public official" to mean, among other things, "an officer
or employee or person acting for or on behalf of the United States, or any de-
partment, agency or branch of Government thereof.., in any official function,
under or by authority of any such department, agency, or branch of government."
18 U.S.C. § 201(a)(1). This definition obviously includes any scientist employed
by the NIH.
11 National Institutes of Health Manual, chapter 2300-735-4, Outside Work
and Activities, (Revised 9/1/88) ("Manual").3 1 Id. at § 2300-735-4(A) at 1.
39 See id. at § 2300-735-4(D)(1)(a) at 8; 15 U.S.C. § 3710a(a) (CRADA represents
work "on behalf of' the sponsoring federal agency).
40 18 U.S.C. § 210(a), (b).
41 18 U.S.C. § 203(a).
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A related statute prohibits a government officer or employee from par-
ticipating "personally and substantially" in, among other things, a "con-
tract" or "other particular matter" in which the employee has a financial
interest.42 The penalty is a fine not to exceed $10,000 and/or up to two
years in prison.
Finally, it is clear that a private company may not circumvent any of
the above provisions by offering a gift or salary "bonus" to the scientist
for his or her additional value to the company. Government employees
may not accept anything of value "for or because of any official act per-
formed or to be performed," and the salary of a United States employee
may be paid only by the United States. 43
B. HHS Regulations and NIH Rules
The HHS regulations add some specificity to these criminal provisions.
For example, an HHS employee may not solicit or accept anything of
monetary value from a person the employee knows or should know has
sought or is seeking a contract, or a business or financial relation with
the employee's "principal operating component" (i.e., an NIH institute or
laboratory)." The employee also may not participate personally and sub-
stantially as a government employee in any matter in which he or she
has a financial interest.45 Violation of any HHS conflict of interest reg-
ulation may result, in addition to the criminal penalties described above,
in administrative discipline, including admonishment, written repri-
mand, reassignment, suspension, demotion, and removal.48
An additional regulatory provision and other related NIH Manual pro-
visions should be noted primarily in relation to the NIH scientist's con-
sulting role. The Manual permits employees to enter into consulting
agreements with private concerns under certain conditions. The condi-
tions include accepting no more than $25,000 annually, with no more
than $12,500 from any individual company.47 NIH also prohibits scientists
from consulting for the same company with which they are collaborating
under a CRADA. This NIH policy is based on a regulation prohibiting
consulting for companies "with which the official duties of the employee
are directly related, or indirectly related if the indirect relationship is
significant enough to cause the existence of conflict or apparent conflict
of interest. '48
42 18 U.S.C. § 208(a). The statute also applies to the employee's family, or any
organization in which he or she serves as an officer, director, trustee, partner, or
employee, or with which he or she is negotiating or has an arrangement for future
employment. Id.
43 18 U.S.C. §§ 201(c)(1), 209.
- 45 C.F.R. § 73.735-501.
4545 C.F.R. § 73.735-801. This provision also applies to the other persons
identified in 18 U.S.C. § 208(a). Id.
45 C.F.R. § 73.735.1201.
47 Manual, § 2300-735-4 at 12.
- 45 C.F.R. § 73.735-704(a)(1) (emphasis added).
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In addition, NIH employees must obtain approval of the proposed ac-
tivity prior to entering into any consulting arrangement and must avoid
any outside activity that would result in a conflict of interest, affect NIH's
appearance of objectivity in the eyes of the biomedical community, or
interfere with an employee's regularly assigned duty.4 9 As a consultant,
an NIH scientist may provide a company with the benefit only of his or
her "general knowledge and expertise."50 Information "concerning the
employee's ongoing NIH research" may not be provided under a consult-
ing agreement unless the information is also made available to the public
on a nonexclusive basis. 1 This situation is different under a CRADA,
which by statute calls for the sharing of the scientist's research infor-
mation with the company, and typically, by agreement, places certain
confidentiality obligations on the scientist. 52
C. Tensions Between Technology Transfer and Conflict of Interest Laws
The provisions described will affect NIH scientists who are involved in
CRADAs with private industry in two ways. One category of effects is
represented by certain clear rules that, if followed, should not be cause
for concern. A second category, however, is rife with potential for conflict.
1. Clear Rules
Under the plain languag@ of the current law, no NIH scientist may
accept anything of value as payment for helping a company obtain or
negotiate the terms of a CRADA"3 or as a reward or gratuity for partic-
ipating in research under a CRADA.5 Similarly, a scientist must take
care not to negotiate or arrange for future employment with any company
with which he or she has a CRADA relationship.55 These restrictions
apply despite the absence of any intentional violation on the part of the
scientist as any violation (intentional or not) could result in criminal
prosecution or administrative sanction.
These provisions do not appear to prohibit contributions of funds, per-
sonnel services, equipment, or other resources to the scientist's lab for
research under a CRADA by a company in which the affected NIH sci-
entist does not own any interest. Such items, if offered and accepted under
a CRADA without corrupt intent, obviously are "provided by law for the
11 Manual, § 2300-735-4(D)(1)(a) at 8; 45 C.F.R. § 73.735-701.
1, Id. at § 2300-735-4(D)(4)(a) at 12.
51 Id.
82 See 15 U.S.C. § 3710(a). Under a typical CRADA, the scientist agrees not to
divulge publicly the confidential or proprietary information of the collaborating
company and to permit the company to review proposed publications or other
public disclosures in advance to prevent any such occurrence. This makes the
collaborator privy to information not available to the public.
3 18 U.S.C. § 203(a); 45 C.F.R. § 73.735-501.
18 U.S.C. §§ 201(c)(1), 209; 45 C.F.R. § 73.735-501.
18 U.S.C. § 208(a); 45 C.F.R. § 73.735-801.
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proper discharge of official duty"50 through the Technology Transfer Act.57
The only potential limitation might arise if such contributions were so
tangential to the research that acceptance might present the appearance
of a conflict of interest.58
2. Potential for Conflict
a. "Financial Interests"
The CRADA provisions of the Technology Transfer Act do, however,
present several other potential tensions with the conflict of interest laws.
For example, under the conflict of interest laws, NIH scientists must avoid
financial interests in any "matter" or "contract" in which the employee
is involved "personally and substantially. 5 9 This language would seem
to preclude a scientist from deriving any financial benefit from work
performed under a CRADA. Yet, the Technology Transfer Act specifically
calls for cash awards to federal employees who contribute to technology
commercialization, and more importantly, requires that agencies share
royalties from commercialized inventions with the inventor-employee 0
Since most CRADAs provide for assignment of patent ownership or li-
censing rights in inventions to the collaborating company, an NIH sci-
entist receiving such royalties from an invention developed under his or
her CRADA obviously will have a financial interest that otherwise would
be prohibited by the conflict of interest laws.
In September, 1988, the United States Office of Government Ethics
issued an advisory opinion that royalty sharing under the Technology
Transfer Act does not give an employee a personal "financial interest" to
which the conflict of interest laws are applicable.6 1 While this definitional
dance clearly was intended by Congress, it does not alter the reality that
royalty sharing and other financial rewards are in fact financial interests
that could encourage scientists to focus on commercialization to the det-
riment of their other official duties or to favor companies with which a
CRADA relationship exists.
b. Consultant - CRADA Issues
A related problem involving consultants has already arisen. The author
has assisted companies wishing to establish CRADAs with NIH scientists
who have existing consulting relationships with the company or with a
related entity. For example, an NIH scientist had a consulting relation-
618 U.S.C. § 201(c)(1).
17 15 U.S.C. § 3710a(d).
-45 C.F.R. § 73.735-701(b)(1).
19 18 U.S.C. § 208(a); 45 C.F.R. § 73.735-801(a).
"15 U.S.C. §§ 3710b, 3710c.
61 Office of Government Ethics, Letter to U.S. Department of Commerce (Sep-
tember 27, 1988).
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ship with a health care venture capital fund and with one of its portfolio
companies. At the time of the CRADA proposal, the portfolio company
had re-financed and was less than half owned by the fund. In addition,
only two of the fund's directors continued to sit on the seven-person board
of the company.
In the course of the scientist's consulting relationship with the company,
the parties determined that it would be to their mutual benefit to propose
a CRADA related to the scientist's existing work at NIH. The terms of
the proposed CRADA provided that the CRADA would supersede the
existing company consulting agreement, but not the agreement with the
fund. Although the CRADA ultimately was approved, the scientist was
required to resign from his consulting position with the fund, as well as
with the company. Thus, the scientist was required to sacrifice a source
of personal income in order to secure the advantages of a favorable re-
search collaboration for his laboratory. Despite their obvious innocence,
these events aroused sufficient notoriety to lead the NIH to sponsor a
conflicts of interest retreat in December, 1988.
These events illustrate several of the tensions that exist between the
Technology Transfer Act and the conflict of interest laws:
i. "Financial Interest". First, a consulting relationship provides a sci-
entist with financial remuneration. If the parties to a consulting agree-
ment propose a CRADA, those consulting fees could be considered
compensation for obtaining the scientist's cooperation in preparing and
proposing the CRADA. Since the CRADA represents the personal and
substantial involvement of the scientist in a "particular matter," con-
sulting fees paid even prior to proposal and adoption of the CRADA could
be construed to represent a prohibited "financial interest" in the business
of the company.
Thus, any time a company and one of its consulting scientists decide
to replace their consulting relationship with a CRADA, an issue will arise
concerning the presence of a conflict of interest. In the absence of an NIH
policy or HHS regulation, this issue will be resolved on an ad hoc and
potentially arbitrary basis by one or more of the numerous NIH officials
who have the opportunity to review the CRADA.
ii. Related Companies. Second, where one or more biotechnology com-
panies has received its initial funding through a single venture capital
fund or other large investor, a scientist with a CRADA with one company
could be prohibited from consulting for the fund or another company under
the HHS regulation which would prohibit consulting for organizations
with which the official duties of the scientist (i.e., the CRADA) are suf-
ficiently related to cause the appearance of a conflict. 2 In the absence of
a policy or regulation, identifying the point where such a relationship
becomes too indirect to create even the appearance of conflict is deter-
mined on a case-by-case basis.
62 45 C.F.R. § 73.735-704(a)(1).
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IV. OPTIONS FOR RESOLUTION OF TENSIONS
The Technology Transfer Act instructs each agency which implements
CRADA or licensing authority to review its employee standards of conduct
to ensure that they adequately establish guidelines for situations likely
to arise.63 If unable to resolve potential conflicts within the existing stat-
utory framework, the agency is instructed to propose necessary changes
to the appropriate congressional committee.64 This final section suggests
certain options for resolving some of the tensions described above. These
options may be considered by the NIH as either changes in policy or
regulation, or as proposed legislation.
As may be seen from the above discussion of tensions, the Technology
Transfer Act embodies a substantially revised congressional attitude to-
ward the participation of government scientists in the commercial en-
deavors of private industry. Certain personal financial interests that are
clearly prohibited by existing conflict of interest laws are encouraged,
and even mandated, under the Technology Transfer Act.
It is apparent then that some revision in current conflict of interest
statutes, HHS regulations, or NIH policy, is required. The federal conflict
of interest laws apply where public and private interests conflict. As
explained in the introduction to the regulations, the purpose of the conflict
of interest provisions applicable to HHS employees is "[t]o assure that
the business of [HHS] is conducted effectively, objectively, and without
improper influence or the appearance of improper influence ... [by as-
suring that employees avoid] conflicts of private interests with public
responsibilities."65
The financial incentive provisions of the Technology Transfer Act sug-
gest that, at least in part, a CRADA represents a confluence, not a conflict,
of private interests with public responsibilities. The Office of Government
Ethics' decision that royalty-sharing with a CRADA scientist is not a
prohibited financial interest illustrates that the government shares this
view. As long as new regulations or policies appear unlikely to "improp-
erly influence" the course of NIH research, or otherwise to interfere with
the "efficiency" and "objectivity" of NIH, they will satisfy the conflict of
interest laws. Where an accommodation cannot be reached under existing
law, the NIH and HHS have a statutory and moral obligation to rec-
ommend appropriate amendments to the Congress.
The following paragraphs briefly suggest options for resolving some of
the most prominent of these tensions between the Technology Transfer
Act and the conflict of interest laws.
15 U.S.C. § 3710a(c)(3)(A).
15 U.S.C. § 3710a(c)(3)(B).
-45 C.F.R. § 73.735-101.
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A. Redefinition of Prohibited "Financial Interest"
Under current law, an NIH scientist may not receive cash or property
or hold stock or other "financial interests" that would result from a "par-
ticular matter" in which the scientist is engaged. Since the Technology
Transfer Act requires that a scientist participating in a CRADA receive
a portion of the royalties on any resulting invention, it is clear that such
royalties cannot be a prohibited financial interest. This result is mandated
by statute and has been accomplished by the Office of Government Ethics
ruling.
However, the principle recognized by this Technology Transfer Act pro-
vision is that federal law no longer prohibits all "financial interests" in
the fruits of private industry collaboration. Given this fact, it seems ap-
propriate for the NIH (by policy) or HHS (by regulation) to promulgate
a narrower definition of "financial interest" for purposes of inventions
resulting from a CRADA. Such a definition could permit any such interest
that is less likely than royalty-sharing to interfere with the purposes of
the NIH by placing undue pressure on scientists to point their research
in commercial directions.
In determining whether a particular financial interest is more or less
likely than royalty-sharing to entice an NIH scientist away from his or
her fundamental mission of research, it may be useful to construct a
hierarchy of effects that various such interests are likely to have on
scientists. At one extreme there would be an interest that depends upon
the profitability of the collaborating company. This category would in-
clude, among other things, stock or stock options. Incentives such as these
seem most likely to lead a scientist to channel his or her research in a
direction favored by the company.
At the other extreme would be financial interests that have little or
no dependence upon the profitability of collaborating companies. This
category would include interests such as a fixed bonus to be awarded to
a collaborating scientist. Such a bonus would be least dependent on the
profitability of the private company if it were administered by the NIH
out of a pooled account established by all companies collaborating with
a particular laboratory or institute. Even if the supplement were paid
directly by the collaborating company, the scientist's interest would solely
depend on the continued existence of the company, not on its greater or
lesser profitability.
Royalty-sharing falls somewhere between these two extremes, but it
falls closer to the top, i.e., to the profitability-dependent end of the hi-
erarchy. Royalty payments typically are a percentage of gross sales of a
product and, therefore, the amount varies in proportion to how much
profit the particular invention generates for the company. On the other
hand, royalty payments, like salary supplementation, will cease
altogether only if the company fails or stops making the product.
What is clear from this discussion is that a supplemental salary is less
likely than royalty-sharing to induce a scientist to direct his or her re-
[Vol. 4:1
PUBLIC-PRIVATE PARTNERSHIPS
search in favor of a collaborating company. As noted above, a federal
statute prohibits the payment of a government salary by a private com-
pany. However, given the royalty-sharing provision and underlying policy
of the Technology Transfer Act, the NIH might lawfully be permitted
without legislative action to establish a pool of funds from collaborating
companies and use it to supplement the salaries of scientists participating
in a CRADA. This approach has been used for years by many major
universities to supplement the income of physicians and scientists. Even
if such a program were not permissible without legislation, the NIH would
clearly be within its authority under the Technology Transfer Act to
propose such legislation to Congress.66
B. Consultant-CRADA Issues
The issues presented by an NIH scientist who, in the course of a con-
sulting arrangement, seeks to begin developing a CRADA proposal with
the private company, are somewhat more complex. This creates issues
concerning both financial interests and the sharing of information.
1. "Financial Interests"
When an industry consultant and his or her company develop a CRADA
proposal, the issue presented is the extent to which consulting fees might
be viewed as a prohibited "financial interest" under the conflict of interest
laws. Perhaps the easiest solution, and one that probably could be ac-
complished by NIH policy or HHS regulation, is a redefinition of "financial
interest" to exclude consulting fees paid prior to implementation of the
CRADA.
Another solution would be to retain the current conflict of interest rule
prohibiting an NIH scientist from discussing non-public ongoing research
in the course of industry consultation. Application of this rule would
require a scientist to terminate his or her consulting agreement at the
moment a decision is made to pursue a CRADA proposal. This solution
has the twin advantages of not disrupting existing NIH policy and of
being self-policing. Since NIH scientists currently are trusted not to di-
vulge information on ongoing research during a consulting relationship,
there is no apparent reason why they should not be trusted to exercise
the same good judgment prior to beginning CRADA negotiations.
The least desirable solution would be for NIH to impose a waiting period
after a consulting agreement before the consulting scientist could work
with the same company under a CRADA. This solution is least desirable
because it would postpone valuable research collaboration for any sci-
entist who, ironically, has determined to sacrifice the personal financial
benefit of a consulting fee in favor of the NIH/public benefit of a CRADA.
15 U.S.C. § 3710a(c)(3)(B).
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2. Related Companies
It is NIH policy to prohibit scientists from consulting for a private
company while simultaneously working with that company under a
CRADA because such work, by definition, is "directly related" to the
scientist's "official duties." In addition, any consultation for the same
company, even in an area outside the scope of the CRADA, is considered
to be a sufficiently "significant" indirect relationship to cause the ap-
pearance of a conflict.
However, this reasoning is not persuasive as applied to a scientist who
consults for a venture capital fund that provided the initial financing for
a company with which the scientist wishes to establish a CRADA ("Com-
pany A"). The reasoning is still less compelling if the same scientist wishes
to consult instead for a different company initially financed by the fund
("Company B"). In neither case does the scientist's consulting have any
"direct" relationship to his or her official duties. The only question is
whether there is an "indirect" relationship significant enough to create
an apparent conflict.
Neither the NIH Manual nor HHS regulations define what is meant
by the "appearance" of a conflict of interest. In the absence of any such
direct authority, the closest analogous principles of law would seem to be
those requiring a judge to recuse himself or herself from hearing a case
that would create the appearance of impropriety. The classic formulation
of this standard calls for disqualification where the judge's impartiality
might reasonably be questioned.6 7
The test of reasonableness is whether an objective, disinterested ob-
server, fully informed of all the facts, would entertain significant doubt
that justice would be served absent recusali8 Adapting this standard to
the situation at hand, the question would be whether a reasonable, in-
formed observer would entertain a significant concern that an NIH sci-
entist would be tempted by a consulting fee to alter the direction of
research under a CRADA with Company A, in order to benefit the entity
paying the fee (the fund or Company B), in a manner inconsistent with
his or her official duties.
The answer to this question will depend on the specific factual situation.
Thus, a comprehensive statement of general principles for purposes of
NIH policy or HHS regulations might be difficult to formulate. However,
certain basic principles should not be hard to articulate.
It seems clear that an appearance of conflict could reasonably be found
only if the directors of the fund were in a position to set the scientific
policies of the company with the CRADA (Company A). This is so because
unless the fund had this sort of control, the company's scientific interests
would be likely to diverge from those of the fund. The NIH scientist thus
See, e.g., United States v. Haldeman, 559 F.2d 31,132 n. 297 (D.C. Cir. 1976),
cert. denied sub nom. Erlichman v. United States, 431 U.S. 933 (1977).
E.g., Pepsico, Inc. v. McMillen, 764 F.2d 458, 460 (7th Cir. 1985).
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could not focus his or her work in a direction desired by the fund. In this
typical situation then, the fund's interest in the direction of research
under a CRADA is sufficiently remote that an informed observer could
not reasonably entertain significant concern that payment of a consulting
fee by the fund would tempt a scientist to move that research in a direction
chosen by the fund.
There is still less appearance of conflict where the NIH scientist wishes
to consult for Company B while participating in a CRADA with Company
A. Again, as long as Company B is not in a position to control the scientific
interests of the company with the CRADA (either directly, or by virtue
of being itself controlled by the fund), a consulting fee from Company B
does not present any reasonable appearance of a conflict of interest with
the official duties of the scientists under the CRADA.
In formulating CRADA regulations or policy then, HHS or NIH could
reasonably adopt a standard that permits a scientist with a CRADA with
Company A to consult simultaneously for the venture capital fund that
provided its initial financing, unless the fund exercises control over the
scientific activities of the company. In the case of consulting for Company
B, such consulting should be permitted unless the fund controls both
entities. An appropriate and easily enforced standard for control would
be to hold a majority of Company A's stock or a majority of the seats on
its board of directors.
V. CONCLUSION
Like universities in the 1970s, federal laboratories such as the NIH
now face the daunting but important challenge of cooperating with pri-
vate industry to bring the wealth of their scientific knowledge. and ex-
perience into the stream of commerce. The task is daunting because it
requires a careful balancing of potential competing interests: the scien-
tist's need for freedom to pursue new directions; the government's need
to assure the public benefit of inventions derived from public funds; and
industry's need to assure a reasonable return on its investments by pro-
tecting its trade secrets and proprietary information from its competitors.
The task is made more daunting by the restrictions placed on financial
compensation of NIH scientists, as compared with their counterparts in
academia and private industry. Yet, meeting the challenge is important
because such a sharing of knowledge and resources presents tremendous
potential for rapidly reducing scientific advances from laboratory exper-
iments to products and processes that will aid in the treatment of disease.
The CRADA process begun by the Technology Transfer Act creates the
framework for such developments. Important cooperative efforts are al-
ready under way at the NIH. But much remains to be done, specifically
in the area of conflicts of interest. The NIH should begin by adopting
policies and working with HHS officials to develop regulations that give
full range to the employee financial incentives already authorized by the
Technology Transfer Act, while protecting the legitimate interest of ac-
ademic freedom and assuring a public benefit from public funds.
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Redefining prohibited "financial interests" to exclude certain rewards
resulting from CRADA research is one possible beginning that might be
accomplished without legislative action. Other financial incentive pro-
grams that present less of a risk of conflict of interest than the royalty-
sharing and reward provisions of the Technology Transfer Act might also
be permissible by NIH policy or HHS regulation. In addition, a set of
rules covering typical situations where CRADAs and consulting agree-
ments might be thought to overlap would be beneficial. Of course, any
such plans, even ambitious ones, could be proposed to Congress with the
NIH's endorsement.
Armed with the mandate given it by the Technology Transfer Act, the
NIH should begin collaborating with industry not only to develop new
biotechnology, but to develop new policies that will encourage more sci-
entific cooperation by easing the tensions between the technology transfer
and conflict of interest laws. Ultimately, the beneficiaries of both forms
of collaboration will be those whose illnesses are cured by the resulting
inventions.
